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Introduction
This document is a summary of 16 key research and game findings focused
specifically on the characteristics of civil-military response to a pandemic
scenario. The numbered bullets below correspond to more detailed explanations
of findings presented later in the document. While these findings are in no way
definitive or complete, they are a sampling of relevant guidance based on research,
gaming and expert opinion. It is our hope that these 16 findings will contribute to
improving civilian and military effectiveness in humanitarian assistance and
disaster response operations.
Note on Urban Outbreak 2019
The document references “Urban Outbreak 2019,” which was an analytic war
game designed, delivered and analyzed by NWC’s Humanitarian Response
Program in collaboration with Uniformed Services University of the Health
Sciences (USUHS) - National Center for Disaster Medicine and Public Health
(NCDMPH) and Johns Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Lab. In September
2019, Urban Outbreak brought together 50 experts from five different sectors who
averaged 10 years of humanitarian response experience. Over two days they
gamed an infectious disease outbreak response in a notional but realistic city with
a population of 21 million people. As part of the game, players individually voted
for up to five essential organizations to which they needed access in order to
complete the activities they deemed essential for success in the response.
Histograms of those votes are offered in appendix I & II. The scenario-based
aspects of the game that focused specifically on the unique characteristics of urban
response in a widespread outbreak are also listed in appendix III.
Select Research & Game Findings 1
1. Early actions and planning across all sectors are exponentially more
important than reactive measures once the disease is widespread.

2. There will be intense and overwhelming demands for access to a few key
health related organizations that are viewed as authorities in the early
stages of a response. As the response moves forward, the number of
stakeholders who are in high demand will increase and diversify.
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3. While a response will often focus on serving the infected, any response
must also focus on all the ways to lower the R “naught” or R0 (the average
number of people infected by each new person infected). Regularly
identifying high-risk practices that raise the R0 and replacing them with
suitable alternatives for a population is an exceptionally difficult and
absolutely essential factor for success.

4. Forced mass quarantine or other top down approaches to an outbreak that
securitize the response with law enforcement and/or military enforcement
may not be successful and could increase the spread of the disease.
5. Questioning the data central to planning and operations in an outbreak is
an essential reflex that needs to be developed and sustained throughout an
organization.

6. Currently, mortality is a better indicator of the scale of the COVID-19
outbreak than lab confirmed case counts. These facts on the ground are
inherently lagging a couple weeks behind infections, but without real time
and widespread testing of infections, mortality offers tangible and reliable
data. Mortality “doubling time” is the most important and widely accessible
metric for winning the race against COVID-19 in the absence of extensive
testing.
7. Establish local media relationships early for risk communication as
outbreak intensifies. In order to effectively combat misinformation and
rumors, risk communication should be hyper-local, establish a track record
for truth early, and directly involve known community members with a
stated focus of honesty over polished language or production value.
8. Responders may be overconfident if they are not directly connected to the
field. Frontline healthcare workers and first responders are often a good
source of realistic assessments.

9. Personal and professional risk tolerance for humanitarian response
activities is generally much higher for non-governmental organizations and
medical first responders than it is for the military and U.S. government
employees.
10. Even in the planning phase, the military and government may (consciously
or unconsciously) exhibit avoidance behaviors to limit the scope of their
involvement with affected and/or infected populations in the field.
11. A highly unusual mission and/or unprecedented response conditions such
as pandemic response will meet with significant resistance, even among
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experienced professionals. This can directly inhibit effective planning and
adaptation.

12. Private sector organizations are an absolutely essential and uniquely
nimble component of any large-scale response. They must be integrated
into planning throughout all phases of a response.

13. The U.S. government may need to clarify the difference between an
“outbreak response” and a “humanitarian disaster” though these activities
are not mutually exclusive.

14. Health care, drugs or other treatments should be provided through
whatever means people are accustomed to within their local communities.
15. Social norms will change during a period of crisis; this demands careful
observation and adaptation.

16. Responding organizations may not be aware that some response activities
will not scale to meet the demands of an outbreak as they might for other
disasters.
Expanded Findings

1. Early actions and planning are exponentially more important than
reactive measures once the disease is widespread.
Any containment strategy requires testing and tracing. This is not possible once a
large enough population is infected. In the same way, altering business, social or
cultural practices is significantly less effective when a society is facing a wide
range of new challenges, especially severe economic and social pressures. Clarity,
speed and repetition are essential for changes within a population and are most
effectively achieved before other factors start making decisions for them.
Generally, any action taken after a virus is widespread will be less effective due to
the virus’ impact on society. The larger and more complicated the action, the
more the impact of the disease will be felt in its execution.
2. There will be intense and overwhelming demand for access to a few key
health related organizations that are viewed as authorities in the early
stages of a response. As the response moves forward, the number of
stakeholders who are in high demand will increase and diversify.
Urban Outbreak Example: After a shared briefing, 66% of the players voted that
the Ministry of Health was the most essential stakeholder to which they needed
access to complete their response activities during the initial outbreak. When
players voted again after the briefing at the apex of the outbreak, their priorities
for access had diversified by approximately 20% across a wider range of
stakeholders. Players also voted to add approximately 30% more stakeholders as
essential to their response activities. See histograms below.
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3. While a response will often focus on serving the infected, any response
must also focus on all the ways we can lower the R0.
Pandemics are a function of human behavior mixed with a pathogen that has a
specific R “naught” or R0. The R0 represents a simple average of how many
people each infected person will infect. So R1.5 would mean everyone who gets
the disease gives it to one and a half other people. The important thing to
remember is the R3 means an exponential growth curve for the disease but it is
not a fixed number. The R0 is a product of all the behaviors and environmental
factors that result in those three new infections. So if society can change how they
behave or alter the environment to lower that R3 to an R1 (or lower) while
treating the infected, the disease will not be able to replicate enough to survive. In
some cases this could be as simple as hand washing or social distancing, in other
cases like Ebola it may clash with longstanding cultural practices like body
preparation and burial by hand. Regularly identifying these high-risk practices
that raise the R0 and replacing them with suitable alternatives for a
population is an exceptionally difficult and absolutely essential factor for
success.
4. Forced mass quarantine or any other top down approach to an outbreak
securitizes the response. This may not be successful and could increase the
spread of the disease.
Sick people actively seeking care, testing and public health messages concerning
self-isolation and quarantine of contacts are the ways to end outbreaks. Forced
mass quarantines are a direct barrier to those activities. One cannot slow the
spread of disease if people hide infections out of fear or stigma. When authorities
attempt to enforce a mass quarantine on a large population they will not be 100%
effective. By stigmatizing the infection and symptoms they will teach others to
hide their symptoms and drive key populations underground. This results in less
sharing of information with authorities and medical providers, and the most
desperate and the highest risk populations will seek to break quarantine.

5. Questioning the data central to planning and operations in an outbreak is
an essential reflex that needs to be developed and sustained throughout an
organization.
Data collection, analysis and dissemination in a disaster response are by their very
nature contentious political activities. Responders require data to execute their
responses but rarely do the data collection and analysis themselves. This can lead
to a significant weakness related to outbreaks as responders can base too many of
their major decisions on external findings that may be dated, inaccurate, or
misleading.
Example from Urban Outbreak: There was no questioning or rejection of the
epidemiological reports given to the players even though the infection curve did
not follow the normal trajectory for this type of outbreak. This was especially
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apparent in the final round when there was no clear indicator of why the reported
number of infections had fallen dramatically and yet many of the players
embraced the idea that it was due to a successful response. This was concerning
because designers anticipated questions about data collection and reliability by
such a wide array of seasoned experts but not blind acceptance of such abnormal
reports.

6. Currently, mortality is a better indicator of the scale of the COVID-19
outbreak than lab confirmed case counts. These facts on the ground are
inherently lagging a couple weeks behind infections, but without real time
and widespread testing of infections, mortality offers tangible and reliable
data.
While there is a great deal of data emerging about infection rates in the United
States it is inherently behind the infection curve, incomplete and unreliable. For
this reason, mortality is a better indicator of the scale of the COVID-19 outbreak
than lab confirmed case counts. While even this number has room for error and
each death for COVID-19 is estimated to take 13-17 days - causing a long lag
between interventions and results. It is more manageable data and allows rough
calculations for decision-making. For example, instead of attempting to measure
the number of infected, experts have offered that lengthening the number of days
it takes mortality to double or “doubling time” is the most important and
widely accessible metric for winning the race against COVID-19 in the
absence of extensive testing. The further from three days the doubling time gets,
the further a population is from the runaway period of the pandemic.
7. Establish local media relationships early for risk communication as
outbreak intensifies.
Urban Outbreak Example: Upon reaching the apex of the outbreak in round two
NGOs and some U.S. Government (USG) independently identified a shift from
national to local media outlets and dissemination, focusing on TV, radio, and
billboards for “carpet bombing” public health messaging (as opposed to web,
national or international) in order to build local trust, relevance, and community
response rate. It will also increase a responder’s control over speed of delivery
and accuracy.

When focused on protecting public health, authenticity, truth and actionable
information are the currency of successful risk communications. This is directly at
odds with crisis communication, which is intended to shape messages to defend,
protect or promote a particular brand or interest. In a sustained crisis the public
will become increasingly dismissive of messages that don’t reflect the immediacy
or intensity of their experience or sentiments. In order to effectively combat
misinformation and rumors, risk communication should be hyper-local,
establish a track record for truth early, and directly involve known
community members with a stated focus of honesty over polished language
or production value. To maintain legitimacy in risk communication,
inconsistencies in messages, response failures and/or public expressions of
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intense anger or grief should not be omitted or censored. Instead, they should be
voiced, explained and offered as legitimate and understandable aspects of a
community wide crisis.

8. Responders may be overconfident if they are not directly connected to the
field. Frontline healthcare workers are often a good source of more realistic
assessments.
Example from Urban Outbreak: Players in round one (early onset) and round two
(outbreak apex) were asked to rank their confidence in their ability to complete
their priority activities if they had full access to those essential stakeholders they
selected. In their post move survey they were asked to rate their assessment of the
impact their priority activities would have on the overall response. There was no
significant change in confidence by any group except for Bravo Cell even though
the outbreak grew exponentially. Participants in Bravo Cell – (NGO players), were
statistically less confident in their ability to achieve their first priority activity
between move one and move two. This confidence measure was from the only
group focused on directly serving the affected population through medical care
and other local programing. They were inherently more connected to the reality of
directly running diverse patient-facing medical and public health programs. They
are also highly aware of the personal risks they have to manage or mitigate as the
programmatic leads in the field.
9. Personal and professional risk tolerance for humanitarian response
activities is generally much higher for non-governmental organizations and
medical first responders than it is for the military and US government
employees.
Urban Outbreak Example: Humanitarian organizations were significantly more
engaged in the problem set on the ground than their military or government
counterparts. While fully aware of security and logistical challenges in front of
them, humanitarians and healthcare workers think in terms of baseline conditions
for access, program rollout and sustainment first and consider complicating
factors second. Military and government generally focus on authorities, mission
parameters, personal security and other similar issues for an exceedingly longer
time before even considering the functional factors involved in the effective
execution of a mission or program. As the military and government engage in that
early planning phase, they identify a great deal more reasons why they cannot do
something rather than how they can. It is the opposite for humanitarians and
healthcare workers because their work is predicated on the idea of responding
unless there is an absolutely unacceptable risk. This can lead to cultural clash
when collaborating. For example in Urban Outbreak, humanitarians became
frustrated with discussion points offered by the military and USAID explaining:
“Health care workers don’t need to waste time discussing coordination or mission
drift – coordination is an activity you do and our mission is the population in front of
us.”
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10. Even in the planning phase, the military and government may
(consciously or unconsciously) exhibit avoidance behaviors to limit the
scope of their involvement with affected and/or infected populations in the
field.
Urban Outbreak Example: This was highly apparent across a wide range of
military and USG (e.g. CDC, HHS, USAID) players. Avoidance behaviors were most
often exhibited as redirection of discussions and moves related to serving affected
populations towards nebulous high-level policy issues, minutia of command
structures, and coordination imperatives. When pushed towards planning direct
response activities, these players often used coordination with other “expert”
organizations to passively externalize any personal or organizational risk of direct
engagement with the population. The fact that these players knew the infection in
the game was curable (with moderate immunity) with just two doses of antibiotics
but actively avoided discussing distribution, or prophylactic force protection,
lends credence to this interpretation. Humanitarians almost exclusively voted for
affected/infected populations, as their most essential stakeholder to access, while
other players did not vote for them at all. This shows a significant gap in the
response community, as direct assistance to the infected will be a primary and
overwhelming task in a pandemic.
11. A highly unusual mission and/or unprecedented response conditions
will meet with significant resistance, even among experienced professionals.
This can directly inhibit effective planning and adaptation.
In the design and execution of the Urban Outbreak, experts at all levels sometimes
vehemently rejected those game elements that they felt were too foreign to their
experience. The original pathogen proposed for the game had an R0 closer to the
COVID-19 virus, exhibited itself with cold and flu like symptoms, and required
long-term intensive medical care for a small portion of the population. This
proposal was rejected for a variant of a known and curable bacterial pathogen.
The learning opportunity lost by failing to use the original pathogen proposed is
now obvious.

Urban Outbreak Example: During gameplay players would often exhibit physical
discomfort and become argumentative concerning those aspects of the scenario
that did not conform to their previous experience. This occurred even when other
experts in the room would vouch for the scenario’s veracity and relevance. The
concern is that these reactions generally led resistant players to ignore or
overlook good resources and guidance in their problem solving. If left unchecked it
can often lead to a groupthink sentiment of “different is dangerous,” with an
obvious impact on effectiveness. This was exhibited in the game as key groups
failed to engage in new and different aspects of the scenario (e.g. unique urban
environment, mass antibiotic distribution, cooperation with local gangs) and
instead retreated to exploration of known quantities, (e.g. C2 structures or
information gathering activities).
7

12. Private sector organizations are an absolutely essential and uniquely
nimble component of any large-scale response.
Urban Outbreak Example: A lead for a private sector logistics company offered
some of the most tangible and innovative approaches to the problem set. The
solution from his standpoint was to maintain business continuity (even while
taking losses) by ensuring everyone on his payroll and their families had early
access to antibiotics. He was confident his business would already have devoted
members of local gangs and their families on the payroll as employees and so his
early interest in their health and safety would open up the supply lines he would
be able to use throughout the response. However, he had no interest in using
overland shipping options due to security concerns and poor road infrastructure
and instead sought to ferry all goods on waterways by employing a public private
partnership with the local transit authority. With this strategy he was able to
divide up most of the population centers and reach them without military support,
air assets or many changes to his existing business model.
13. The U.S. Government may need to clarify the difference between an
“outbreak response” and a “humanitarian disaster” though these activities
are not mutually exclusive.
Urban Outbreak Example: There was broad agreement among USG players that
round one was an “outbreak response” which required more of a testing, contact
tracing and health advisory role while round two was a “humanitarian disaster”
requiring a different approach. There was still limited discussion of actually
engaging the infected population. Priorities became personal security, disease
surveillance, restricting movement by decentralizing resources, and looking for
public health response mechanisms outside of health systems (e.g. sanitation
efforts).
14. Health care, drugs or other treatments should be provided through
whatever means people are accustomed within their communities.
Urban Outbreak Example: In order to implement programs that are quickly
accepted and effective with minimal disruption in dense urban areas, the
international response needed to provide drugs, testing and aid through preestablished pharmacies, community organizations, religious leaders or
practitioners without caveats.

15. Social norms will change during a period of crisis.
Some changes may be characterized as normal coping mechanisms, but flagrant
criminal activity must be actively pursued to reinforce social norms. The black
market will inevitably become a critical factor as market pressures increase risk,
reward and opportunity. Crime will also increase given the same factors, but
including economic desperation and an opportunistic “testing” of authorities’
control. Drug use, alcoholism and domestic abuse will noticeably increase. Every
action by authorities may have magnified implications for individuals, families and
communities.
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16. Responding organizations may not be aware that some response
activities will not scale in the way that they normally would.
Urban Outbreak Example: Red Cross Movements continuously took the role of
respectful and culturally appropriate mortuary affairs but they were never asked
how they would manage disposal of 90,000 bodies in three months nor did they
ever explain that capability. Under normal circumstances this wouldn’t be an
issue, but under extreme circumstances even highly effective and established
organizations should reconsider their capacity over their capabilities.
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A Note on Results Interpretation
The following histograms from Urban Outbreak 2019 show vote type and
frequency from fifty players but they also show vote priority. Players were
instructed that their vote order meant higher or lower levels of access to the
external stakeholders they selected. A player’s first vote was their highest priority
stakeholder descending to their fifth vote. Players could choose from a list of 100
pre-identified organizations or add organizations. The first histogram shows the
vote following the initial outbreak and activation of a response. The second
histogram shows the vote at the height of the outbreak.
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Appendix I

Most Important Stakeholders
All Cells, Move 1

Olympia Ministry of Health

World Health Organisation (WHO)

Multinational Forces US, UK, Chile, Germany

0

5

2
2

4

3

12

3

10

4

2

5

15

Local Healthcare Workers 1 4
2 2
5
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian… 2 2 4
4 1
City Municipality/Olympia Mayor
3 1 20
5
Leadership of Informal Government/Gangs for LGAs 0 3 1 3
4

2

6

10

20

25
6

30

2

3

35

Affected Individuals
202
6
Olympia National Military Involved in Local… 1 1 3 0 3

Political Representative of a Specific Local… 2 1 1 2 2
Local Healers/Informal Healthcare Workers 10 2 3 1
Local Police & Security Officers 10 4 2 0
UN Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian… 1 1 1 2 2

Health NGO 0 2 1 2 1
Local Religious Community Leaders 01 3 2
United States (OFDA)
3 0 2 10
Host Populations 1 2 1 10
International Media/Journalism 0 4

Local Informal Government/Gang Representatives 01 2 01
Olympia Red Cross (or Crescent) National Society
3 010
Rank 1

Rank 2

Rank 3

Rank 4

Rank 5
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Appendix II

Most Important Stakeholders
Move 2, All Cells
0

5

Multinational Forces US, UK, Chile, Germany
5
4
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian…
3
5
Olympia Ministry of Health
6
5
Local Police & Security Officers
4
2 2 2
Olympia National Military Involved in Local… 2 2 1 3
Leadership of Informal Government/Gangs for LGAs
3 1
3
2
City Municipality/Olympia Mayor 1 3
4
2
World Health Organisation (WHO)
4
2
20 3
United States (OFDA)
2 101
5
Local Healthcare Workers 1 2
11
4
Local Informal Government/Gang Representatives
2 2 202
Host Populations
2 2 11 2
Health NGO
2 2 1 3 0
Political Representative of a Specific Local… 2 10 3 1
Affected Individuals
2 1 202
Community Media/Journalism 01 2
3
Private Military/Security Contractors 1 10 3 1
Local Healers/Informal Healthcare Workers 0 2 0 2 1
International Federation of Red Cross & Red…01 3 10
Water, Sanitation, & Hygiene NGO 0 3 1
Local Religious Community Leaders 101 2 0
UN Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian… 10 3 0
United Kingdom (DFID) 0 2 10
Olympia Red Cross (or Crescent) National Society 10101
United States (CDC) 01 10
Medical Supply 0101
Customs 0101
Food Security NGO 01 10
Rank 1

Rank 2

Rank 3

Rank 4

10

5

4
3
1

6

2
3

15
2

4

3

3

2

20

3

25

Rank 5
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Appendix III
Urban Challenges and Areas of Inquiry in Urban Outbreak 2019 Scenario
Round One: Outbreak
• Concept of employing informal public health providers in the response
• Concept of informal governance/security for access or mobility for
vulnerable populations in key dense urban areas
• Establishing role of private security
• Determining differential access to resources based on social strata and
location
• Assessment data from rural mountainous region
• Self-interested government officials and private sector actors
• Prostitution as a vector
• False information/suspicion concerning the outbreak and response
Round Two: Cascading Failures
• Loss of power, utilities, dockworkers, security, etc.
• Failure of existing medical system
• All other medical services severely affected
• Logistical capacity stretched for outbreak response purposes at the
expense of all else
• Hoarding, theft, and black market becomes extremely lucrative
• Increased international military role
• Challenges for responder security and ROE for military
• Ambiguous role of the national government
• Role of informal transit for response
• Flight of populations
• Quarantine/roadblocks
• Mortuary affairs
• PPE and medical demand

Round Three: Cleanup Wish List
• Pre-transition change in priorities
• Engineering, heavy lift or logistics from international military before
transition begins/departure
• Reviving broken livelihoods
• Mortuary affairs
• Refuse in urban areas
• Security - rise of gangs and religious groups
• Badly damaged infrastructure
• Hobbled workforce
• Extreme needs associated with fractured health system (public health
emergencies associated with those failures)
12

